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Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company
v. EEOC. Expanding the Scope of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 prohibits sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy. In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
the United States Supreme Court extended the scope of the Act to include
not only female employees, but also female dependents of male employees.
The author examines the Supreme Court's analysis of and the legislative
intent behind the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and explores the future
impact of the decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of gender.' In General Electric Com-
pany v. Gilbert,2 the Supreme Court determined that discrimina-
tion resulting from an employee's pregnancy was beyond the
scope of the provisions of Title VII. The ruling in Gilbert permit-
ted an employer to exclude pregnancy coverage from an em-
ployee's disability benefits plan.3 Subsequent guidelines issued
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter
referred to as EEOC],4 which interpreted pregnancy-related dis-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 2000e-2(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
2. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
3. Id. at 145-46.
4. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to
as EEOC] is the governmental agency in charge of enforcing Title VII. The en-
forcement provisions it may use in preventing unlawful employment practices are
listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). The relevant enforcement provisions include:
(b) Whenever a charge is ified by or on behalf of a person claiming to
be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, in-
cluding on-the-job training programs, has engaged in an unlawful employ-
crimination to be within the purview of Title VII,5 contradicted
the Gilbert decision.
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
[hereinafter referred to as PDA],6 for the specific purpose of re-
ment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice) on such employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, or joint labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as
the "respondent") within ten days, and shall make an investigation
thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall
contain such information and be in such form as the Commission re-
quires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commission. If the Com-
mission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and
promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of
its action. In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commis-
sion shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by
State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local
law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d) of this sec-
tion. If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
(f) (1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission
or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under sub-
section (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to se-
cure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respon-
dent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision
named in the charge .... Upon application by the complainant and in
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an
attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of
the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Upon timely ap-
plication, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the
Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency,
or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification
that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court
may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty
days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in
subsection (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission
to obtain voluntary compliance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
5. Interpretive guidelines pertaining to this Act were issued in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.10(b) (1983), which states in pertinent part:
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the
same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions,
under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in
connection with employment. Written or unwritten employment policies
and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration
of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other
benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or
disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied
to disability due to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions on
the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other disabilities.
Id. See also infra note 65.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980). The relevant portion of the PDA
provides:
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versing what Congress believed to be an incorrect ruling in Gil-
bert.7 The definition of sex discrimination under the PDA
expressly includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or other related conditions. 8 However, while the PDA
clearly prohibits pregnancy discrimination against female em-
ployees, courts have struggled over the proper scope of the Act's
coverage. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits reached opposite conclusions 9 on the issue of whether the
Act covers female employees only, or also extends to female de-
pendents of male employees.
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company v.
EEOC,O the Supreme Court not only backed away from its much-
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or in-
ability to work .
Id.
7. 123 CONG. REc. 29,641 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) ("This legislation was
made necessary by an unfortunate decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the
case of Gilbert v. General Electric [sic] .... ). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749 [hereinaf-
ter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Ba-
sis of Pregnancy; Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE HEARINGS]; 123 CONG. REC.
7539 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams that Gilbert "constituted a serious setback
to women's rights and to the development of antidiscrimination law under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
8. See supra note 6.
9. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir.), affd en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2622
(1983); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
This issue has also been addressed in a number of district court decisions. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (PDA held inap-
plicable to employer-sponsored health plans for employee's dependents which
limited pregnancy-related coverage but not other medical expenses of spouses);
United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Board of Educ., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,759 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982) (employee health insurance plans discriminated
against male employees in violation of Title VII by providing maternity coverage
for female employees and their spouses, but not for male employees and their
spouses); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. and Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. ill. 1981),
aff'd, 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983) (health insurance plan which covered husbands
of female employees was not required to include pregnancy-related coverage for
wives of male employees).
10. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
maligned'1 holding in Gilbert, but it also extended the scope of in-
dividuals covered under Title VII. In analyzing the Supreme
Court's decision in Newport News, this Note will examine the leg-
islative history of the PDA and the various approaches used by
courts of appeals in an effort to determine the proper boundaries
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Note further ex-
amines the Court's holding, contending that to effectuate the pur-
pose of Title VII, the broad interpretation used by the Court in
Newport News must be adopted.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. General Electric Company v. Gilbert
In General Electric Company v. Gilbert,12 female employees of
General Electric questioned the validity of the company's disabil-
ity program. The plan provided for weekly compensation during
nonoccupational-related disability, but excluded coverage for dis-
ability arising from pregnancy. In rendering the decision in Gil-
bert, the Court applied the equal protection principles previously
set forth in Geduldig v. Aiello.13
The Court in Gilbert reasoned that benefit plans which exclude
pregnancy-related disabilities affect two groups: pregnant women
and other non-pregnant individuals. While the former group con-
tains only women, the latter group contains members of both
sexes. The Court held that women, as a class, were not being dis-
criminated against in the allocation of benefits because women
were included in both groups.' 4
Thus, the Court stated the plan was legal, in the absence of evi-
dence that males or females were being discriminated against in
terms of aggregate risk protection or evidence that the plan bene-
fited men more than women.' 5 However, the Court noted that
11. See infra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text.
12. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, an action was brought to challenge Cali-
fornia's disability insurance program, which exempted from coverage work losses
resulting from pregnancy. The Court held that this program was constitutional.
Contribution to the employee-funded plan was mandatory for workers who were
privately employed and not otherwise covered by a private voluntary disability
plan. The Court reasoned that the state is not required by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to sacrifice the self-supporting nature of the
program, or increase the maximum employee contribution rate, to provide protec-
tion for another risk such as pregnancy. Id. at 496-97.
14. 429 U.S. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). For an
examination of Gilbert, see Comment, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Em-
ployment: The Impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 717 (1978); Note, Denying Maternity Benefits Is
Not Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 MERCER L. REV. 977 (1977).
15. 429 U.S. at 136.
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such a facially neutral distinction would be invalid if "it were in
fact a subterfuge to accomplish a forbidden discrimination."16
B. Enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 in
response to the Supreme Court's holding in Gilbert.'7 As a result
of the PDA amendment to Title VII, pregnancy classifications
were included in the definition of sex discrimination.18 According
to the PDA, pregnancy classifications are sex-based because the
condition affects only women.' 9
In passing the PDA, Congress adopted the opinion expressed in
Justice Stevens' dissent in Gilbert that the underinclusive disabil-
ity programs differentiated not between pregnant and non-preg-
nant women, but between those who faced the risk of pregnancy
and those who did not.20 Thus, Congress clearly indicated that
pregnancy benefits could not be excluded from an otherwise all-
inclusive disability program:
This bill would prevent employers from treating pregnancy in a manner
different from their treatment of other disabilities. In other words, this
bill would require that women disabled due to pregnancy ... be provided
the same benefits as those provided to other disabled workers ... [WJhere
hospitalization is offered for other disabilities, it must be offered on the
same basis for pregnancy related disabilities. 2
1
C. Interpretation of the PDA by the Court of Appeals
The PDA expanded the scope of Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination:
16. Id.
17. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4751-52. The report indicates that Congress has "clarified its original
intent" to curtail the "intolerable potential trend" started by the Supreme Court in
its Gilbert decision. See also S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: "Surely it offends common sense to suggest ... that
a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex
related.'" 429 U.S. at 149).
20. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 2-3; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4749-50. These reports make ref-
erence to Justice Stevens' statement that "it is the capacity to become pregnant
which primarily differentiates the female from the male." General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 506; reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4753-54; SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 14.
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-re-
lated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work .... 22
Two opposing views have emerged as to the proper limits of the
PDA. These two lines of reasoning are articulated in the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Com-
pany,23 and the Fourth Circuit case of Newport News Shipbuild-
ing and Dry Dock Company v. EEOC.24
1. Ninth Circuit Approach: The Narrow View
In Lockheed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit examined a medical benefits plan which excluded from
coverage pregnancy-related expenses of dependents of Lockheed
employees. 25 The court adopted a narrow view in interpreting the
PDA to apply only to female employees. The rationale for this
holding was that the word "sex", found in section 2000e-2(a) (1) of
the Civil Rights Act,26 should be read as encompassing "preg-
nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." 27 Therefore, the
court felt that a proper reading of the PDA against section 2000e-
2(a) (1) would provide that "it shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation. because of such individual's
... pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. '28
Therefore, the court interpreted the statute's reference to dis-
crimination to encompass only employees as individuals. 29 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the PDA's reference to "employ-
ment-related purposes" and "similar in their ability or inability to
work" strengthened the court's position that Congress intended
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981) (emphasis added).
23. 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
24. 667 F.2d 448, affd en bane, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
25. Lockheed was charged by the EEOC with violating Title VII as amended
by the PDA. Lockheed offered to its employees a no-cost medical benefits plan
which covered expenses of employees' dependents, except for pregnancy. The
EEOC asserted that this pregnancy exclusion discriminated against male employ-
ees in violation of § 2000e-2(a). The EEOC's argument was that a plan which de-
nied full coverage for female spouses solely because of their sex also denies
employment benefits to male employees based on sex, which under the PDA is
consequently prohibited gender-based discrimination. However, the court refused
to read the Act this broadly. 680 F.2d at 1245.
26. See supra note 1.
27. 680 F.2d at 1245.
28. Id. (emphasis in original).
29. Id.
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the PDA to apply only to employees. 3 0
2. Fourth Circuit Approach: The Broad View
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reached a contrary holding in Newport News. At issue in Newport
News was a health insurance plan which provided female employ-
ees and their dependents with full coverage, including pregnancy
expenses, but which provided spouses of male employees with
limited pregnancy coverage. 3 1 The court reasoned that because
the language of the PDA concerning "women affected by preg-
nancy" could apply to spouses of male employees, the Act should
not be applied only to female employees.32 The court found fur-
ther support for this interpretation from the wording of the stat-
ute which ordered equal treatment of females "for all
employment-related purposes." 33 Spousal coverage under a com-
pany health insurance plan was viewed to be as equally related to
employment as the employee's own, especially when spousal ben-
efits are interpreted as part of the employee's compensation and
not merely a gratuitous gift.34 Furthermore, Congress could have
drafted the PDA to refer to "employees," rather than "persons,"
had it intended to limit the Act to female employees. 35 Based
30. Id. The court concluded that Congress' limitation of the provision to em-
ployees was not inadvertent.
31. 667 F.2d at 449. For the full factual background of this case, see infra notes
36-45 and accompanying text.
32. 667 F.2d at 450-51.
33. Id. at 450.
34. Id. at 451. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 450. Additional support is found in the legislative history of the Act
where Senators Bayh and Cranston indicated that if an employer provides full
coverage for spouses of female employees, full coverage must be provided for
spouses of male employees. Senator Bayh expressed the following view:
There remains the question, however, of whether dependents of male em-
ployees must receive full maternity coverage if the spouses of female em-
ployees are provided complete medical coverage. While it is difficult to
second-guess the courts, I feel that the history of sex discrimination cases
under the 14th amendment in addition to previous interpretations of the
Title VII regulations ... will require that if companies choose to provide
full coverage to the dependents of their female employees, then they must
provide such complete coverage to the dependents of their male
employees.
123 CONG. REC. 29,542 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
In reference to a plan which would have excluded pregnancy coverage for
spouses of male employees while fully covering spouses of female employees,
Senator Cranston remarked: "Mr. President, I would like to express for the record
my own view that such a plan would indeed be discriminatory, and would be pro-
upon the above rationales, the court held that the less extensive
coverage afforded married male employees than that provided to
married female employees constituted discrimination on the basis
of sex.
These two conflicting decisions set the stage for the United
States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to review Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company v. EEOC. The two
lower courts' opposing interpretations of the same statute re-
vealed an inherent difficulty in ascertaining the proper scope of
the PDA. As a result, the Supreme Court was presented with the
issue of resolving the scope of coverage of the PDA.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the effective date of the PDA,36 the Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Company [hereinafter referred to as New-
port News] amended its health insurance plan to provide
pregnancy coverage for its female employees to the same extent
allowed for other medical conditions. The amended plan provided
coverage for all employees and their dependents.37
Prior to the enactment of the PDA, the plan's coverage for de-
pendents was identical to its coverage for employees. All males,
employees or dependents, were given the same coverage. Like-
wise, all females, employees or dependents, were treated the
same. However, the only difference in coverage between males
and females was that all females, whether employees or depen-
dent spouses, had a partial limitation in their pregnancy coverage
which did not apply to any other hospital confinement. 38
After the change was made in the health insurance plan to
meet the requirements of the PDA, partial pregnancy limitation
hibited by the Title VII sex discrimination ban." 123 CONG. REC. 29,663 (1977)
(statement of Sen. Cranston).
36. The PDA became effective on the date of its enactment, October 31, 1978.
However, its requirements did not apply to any then-existing fringe benefit pro-
gram until 180 days later (April 29, 1979).
37. Dependents covered under the policy include: employees' spouses, un-
married children between 14 days and 19 years of age, unmarried college students
up to age 23 who are solely dependent on an employee, and certain handicapped
children. 103 S. Ct. at 2624 n.4.
38. For hospitalization caused by uncomplicated pregnancy, [the health
insurance plan of Newport News] paid 100% of the reasonable and cus-
tomary physician's charges for delivery and anesthesiology, and up to $500
of other hospital charges. For all other hospital confinement, the plan paid
in full for a semi-private room for up to 120 days and for surgical proce-
dures; covered the first $750 of reasonable and customary charges for hos-
pital services ... and other necessary services during hospitalization; and
paid 80% of the charges exceeding $750 for such services up to a maxi-
mum of 120 days.
103 S. Ct. at 2625 n.6 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 11: 731, 1984] Newport News v. EEOC
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
coverage for female employees was removed and pregnancy-re-
lated disability was covered to the same extent as for all other
disabilities. However, the level of pregnancy coverage for female
dependents of male employees remained the same as before. 39
Consequently, there was a disparity in treatment between the to-
tal aggregate level of coverage given to male and female employ-
ees. 40 As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted: "To
the extent that the hospital charges in connection with an uncom-
plicated delivery may exceed $500, therefore, a male employee re-
ceives less complete coverage of spousal disabilities than does a
female employee."4 1
On September 20, 1979, a male employee of Newport News filed
a complaint with the EEOC42 alleging that the company had un-
lawfully refused to provide full insurance coverage for his wife's
hospitalization arising out of pregnancy.43 Shortly thereafter,
Newport News sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
challenging the validity of the EEOC's interpretive guidelines.44
A civil action was then filed by the EEOC charging Newport News
with sex discrimination against male employees in the company's
hospitalization benefits.45
The legality of the Newport News health insurance plan was up-
held by the district court and enforcement of the EEOC's provi-
sions pertaining to pregnancy benefits for employee spouses was
enjoined.46 In its decision, the court expressed its belief that the
scope of the PDA was limited to female employees and did not
apply to male employees' spouses. On appeal to the Fourth Cir-
39. In a booklet describing the plan, Newport News explained the new
changes as follows:
B. Effective April 29, 1979, maternity benefits for female employees will
be paid the same as any other hospital confinement....
C. Maternity benefits for the wife of a male employee will continue to
be paid as described in part 'A.
103 S. Ct. 2625 (emphasis added). Part A stated, 'The Basic Plan pays up to $500
of the hospital charges and 100% of reasonable and customary for delivery and an-
esthesiologist charges." Id.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2627.
41. Id. at 2625 (citing 667 F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 1982)).
42. See supra note 4.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2626.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66
(E.D. Va. 1981).
cuit Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed.47 The court's ra-
tionale was that because "the company's health insurance plan
contains a distinction based on pregnancy that results in less
complete medical coverage for male employees with spouses than
for female employees with spouses, it is impermissible under the
statute."48 This same conclusion was reaffirmed upon rehearing.49
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORrTY OPINION
The majority opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, 50 who
had voiced a strong dissent earlier in General Electric Company
v. Gilbert.51 In Gilbert, Justice Stevens had opposed the Court's
holding permitting the exclusion of pregnancy benefits for fe-
males in a company's disability plan. Justice Stevens' earlier dis-
sent in Gilbert formed the basis for the majority's extension of
the scope of the PDA in Newport News.
The central issue discussed by the Court was whether Newport
News discriminated against its male employees with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 52
within the meaning of Title VII, as modified by the PDA.53 The
Court's ruling on this issue established the standard for the
proper scope of the PDA.
In formulating an answer to this issue, the Court was guided by
the legislative intent behind the PDA. Congress had expressed
that a broad54 interpretation would be consistent with the pur-
poses of the Act.55 The legislative history additionally evidenced
47. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 451.
49. 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982).
50. See supra note 20.
51. 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976).
52. It is well established that a Title VII violation may be shown by establish-
ing that fringe benefits provided by an employer are worth more to one sex than to
the other. See, e.g., Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537,
542 (2nd Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, C.J., concurring) (discrimination resulting from
forced maternity leave program); deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School District,
588 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1978) (policy requiring school teachers to take
mandatory ninth-month pregnancy leave and refusing to allow use of accumulated
sick leave benefits during leave of absence was discriminatory).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2625.
54. The courts have broadly construed Title VII issues on previous occasions.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (Ti-
tle VII has application to an unincorporated association set up by a corporation);
Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977) (two corpora-
tions treated as one "employer" for Title VII purposes).
55. The House Report made mention of the "broad social objective of Title
VII." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEWS at 4750. It was stated that "narrow interpretations of Title VII tend to erode
our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment." HOUSE REPORT, supra
[Vol. 11: 731, 19841 Newport News v. EEOC
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congressional disapproval of the Gilbert decision. 56
The Court also relied on the dissenting opinion of Justice Bren-
nan in Gilbert. Justice Brennan had rejected the view that the
plan's pregnancy disability exclusion did not constitute sex dis-
crimination. Justice Brennan stated that it was facially discrimi-
natory for "a policy that, but for pregnancy, offers protection for
all risks, even those that are 'unique to' men or heavily male dom-
inated."57 The same reasoning is evident in Newport News- "The
company's plan, which was intended to provide employees with
protection against the risk of uncompensated unemployment
caused by physical disability, discriminated on the basis of sex by
giving men protection for all categories of risk, but giving women
only partial protection."5 8
After summarizing the applicability of Title VII to pregnancy
disability benefits of female employees, the Court discussed the
application of the PDA to spouses of male employees. Despite
the contention of Newport News that the legislative history fo-
cused only on the needs of female members of the work force, the
Court rejected the argument that this gave rise to "a 'negative in-
ference' limiting the scope of the act to the specific problem that
motivated its enactment." 9 Proponents of the PDA had continu-
note 7, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS at 4751. For further leg-
islative views on the broad view of the PDA, see: 124 CONG. REC. 21,437 (1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Green) (the PDA is of interest not only to working women, but is of
"critical importance to all women in this country"); 123 CONG. REC. 7541 (1977)
(remarks of Sen. Mathias) (Gilbert must be rejected "not only in its specific appli-
cation ... but also in its potential for erosion of Title VII protection against sex dis-
crimination generally").
56. The Senate Reports quoted the dissent in Gilbert, stating that it "correctly
express(es] both the principle and the meaning of Title VII." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 2. The House Report indicated that "[iIt is the committee's view
that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act." HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS at 4749. The bill's propo-
nents continually asserted that the amending legislation was necessary to re-es-
tablish the principles of Title VII law as interpreted prior to the erroneous holding
in Gilbert. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 2-3. The bill thus reinstated the law
as it was understood prior to Gilbert, by the EEOC and by the lower courts.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2628, (citing 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
58. 103 S. Ct. at 2628.
59. Id. at 2629. See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (Ti-
tle IX, which addressed infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business,
did not create negative inference that the statute did not reach the activities of en-
terprises organized expressly for criminal purposes); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976) (where two white employees of transporta-
tion company were discharged for misappropriating cargo, but black employees
similarly charged were not fired, Title VII afforded white employees no less pro-
ally stressed throughout the debates that Congress always in-
tended to protect all individuals from sex discrimination during
employment-not just pregnant female employees.60
The Court noted that "if a private employer were to provide
complete health insurance coverage for dependents of its female
employees, and no coverage at all for the dependents of its male
employees, it would violate Title VII."61 Applying the same ra-
tionale, a plan limiting pregnancy coverage for the spouse of a
male employee, while at the same time entitling female employ-
ees to full coverage for their dependents, also constituted sex dis-
crimination within the meaning of Title VII. Under the plan
adopted by Newport News, dependents of a female employee re-
ceived a specified level of coverage, while dependents of a male
employee received a slightly lower level of coverage based upon
the pregnancy limitation.62 In response to the company's argu-
ment that the prohibition of pregnancy discrimination extends
only to female employees because the statute applies only to dis-
crimination in employment, the Court used a two-step rebuttal:
The [PDA] has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimina-
tion based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because
of her sex. And since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of the
sex of the employee, it follows inexorably that discrimination against fe-
male spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination
against male employees.
6 3
Thus, the Court made it clear that even though an employer can-
not discriminate on the basis of an employee's pregnancy, Con-
gress had not erased the original prohibition against
tection against racial discrimination). The Supreme Court stated in Newport
News that:
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which gives "all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States ... the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," protects whites
against discrimination on the basis of race even though the "immediate
impetus for the bill was the necessity for further relief to the constitution-
ally emancipated former Negro slaves."
103 S. Ct. at 2629 n.18 (1983) (citing McDonald, 427 U.S. 273, 289 (1976)).
60. Id. at 2630. See 123 CONG. REC. 7539 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams)
("the Court has ignored the congressional intent in enacting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act - that intent was to protect all individuals from unjust employment dis-
crimination, including pregnant workers"). See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (male applicant was discriminated against by a state
nursing school that admitted only women for credit); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d
956, 959 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975) (racial discrimination may be
alleged by white male of a racially mixed couple under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Board of
Regents v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976)
(lower minimum salary for male employees violated Equal Pay Act); Diaz v. Pan
Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(males may not be precluded from applying for the position of flight attendant).
61. 103 S. Ct. at 2630.
62. Id. at 2631.
63. Id.
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discrimination on the basis of an employee's sex. 64
The holding in Newport News does not state that employers
must provide the same pregnancy coverage for spouses of male
employees as they provide for female employees, nor does it state
that they must provide coverage for any dependents at all. How-
ever, if an employer makes available to female employees insur-
ance which covers the costs of all medical conditions of their
spouses, but provides male employees with insurance coverage
for only some of the medical conditions of their spouses (i.e., all
but pregnancy-related expenses), male employees receive a less
favorable fringe benefit package, and, therefore, Title VII is
violated.65
64. Proponents of the PDA stressed throughout the debates that Congress had
always intended to protect all individuals from sex discrimination in employment,
including but not limited to, pregnant female workers. See supra note 60.
65. This view was espoused by the EEOC in its interpretive guidelines issued
in conjunction with the PDA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804-23,807 (1979). The questions
and answers are reprinted as an appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1982). The two most
relevant of these questions are questions 21 and 22, which state:
21. Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the
medical expenses of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouses of male
employees?
A. Where an employer provides no coverage for dependents, the em-
ployer is not required to institute such coverage. However, if an em-
ployer's insurance program covers the medical expenses of female
employees, then it must equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of
male employees, including those arising from pregnancy-related condi-
tions.
But the insurance does not have to cover the pregnancy-related condi-
tions of other dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related
conditions of the dependents of male and female employees equally.
44 Fed. Reg. at 23,807 (1979). Question 22 is equally clear in setting the proper
scope of the PDA:
22. Q. Must an employer provide the same level of health insurance
coverage for the pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of
male employees as it provides for its female employees?
A. No. It is not necessary to provide the same level of coverage for the
pregnancy-related medical conditions of spouses of male employees as for
female employees. However, where the employer provides coverage for
the medical conditions of the spouses of its employees, then the level of
coverage for pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of male
employees must be the same as the level of coverage for all other medical
conditions of the spouses of female employees. For example, if the em-
ployer covers employees for 100 percent of the reasonable and customary
expenses sustained for a medical condition, but only covers dependent
spouses for 50 percent of reasonable and customary expenses for their
medical conditions, the pregnancy-related expenses of the male em-
ployee's spouse must be covered at the 50 percent level.
44 Fed. Reg. at 23,807-23,808 (1979).
V. ANALYSIS OF DISSENT
The dissent of Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell, was
premised on the notion that "nothing in the [PDA] even arguably
reaches beyond female employees." 66 The dissenting opinion
cited comments which indicated that the intent of Congress in
overruling Gilbert was to protect the nation's 42 million working
women.67 This served to set narrower limitations on the Act's
provisions.
Justice Rehnquist surveyed the legislative history of the PDA to
substantiate the argument that Congress never intended the PDA
to extend to dependents of male employees. Justice Rehnquist
relied on the following remarks from the Senate Report:
Questions were raised in the committee's deliberations regarding how this
bill would affect medical coverage for dependents of employees, as op-
posed to employees themselves. In this context it must be remembered
that the basic purpose of this bill is to protect women employees, it does
not alter the basic principles of Title VII law as regards sex discrimina-
tion .... [Tj he question of whether an employer who does cover depen-
dents, either with or without additional cost to the employee, may exclude
conditions related to pregnancy from that coverage is a different matter.
Presumably because plans which provide comprehensive medical cover-
age for spouses of female employees but not spouses of male employees
are rare, we are not aware of any Title VII litigation concerning such
plans. It is certainly not the committee's desire to encourage the institu-
tion of such plans.
68
Based on this language, the dissent concluded that the Senate
had disclaimed any intention of dealing with such an issue. This
conclusion was further substantiated with excerpts of a discus-
sion between Senators Hatch and Williams 69 concerning the de-
pendent's benefits issue. Senators Hatch and Williams
unequivocally agreed that the PDA applied only to a woman who
is actually pregnant, who is an employee, and who has become
pregnant after her employment began.70 Thus, in Justice Rehn-
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2637 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2634 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2635 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 5-6 (emphasis
added)).
69. As the principal sponsor of the PDA, Sen. Williams' remarks should be
given great importance when examining the statute. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ("It is the sponsors that we look to when
the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.").
70. Mr. Hatch: ... The phrase "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth
or related medical conditions," . . . appears to be overly broad, and is not
limited in terms of employment. It does not even require that the person
so affected be pregnant. Indeed under the present language of the bill, it is
arguable that spouses of male employees are covered by this civil rights
amendment...*
Could the sponsors clarify exactly whom that phrase intends to cover?
Mr. Williams: . . .I do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy
other than that pregnancy that relates to the employee, and if there is any
ambiguity, let it be clear here and now that this is very precise. It deals
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quist's opinion, the legislative history supported the premise that
the provisions of the PDA should not be extended beyond female
employees.
IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The decision of the Supreme Court in Newport News is signifi-
cant in three respects. The most obvious effect is the establishing
of uniformity among the circuit courts of appeals. As previously
mentioned, the Ninth Circuit Lockheed case and the Fourth Cir-
cuit Newport News case were in direct conflict regarding the
scope of the PDA.'7 The Supreme Court's adoption of the broad
view in Newport News overruled Lockheed and thus a new uni-
form standard72 was set. This standard is consistent with the leg-
islative history of the PDA and corresponds to the interpretive
guidelines issued by the EEOC in conjunction with the Act.
Second, the Court's decision serves to expand the scope of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. The broad approach of Newport News
affirms that Title VII protects males, as well as females, from the
evils of sex discrimination. Consequently, employers must be
careful to provide equal compensation to male and female em-
ployees. Employers cannot disguise unequal treatment by using
the simple expedient of providing the same compensation and
benefits to male and female employees, but providing less com-
plete coverage for a male employee's dependents than depen-
dents of female employees. The mere fact that the benefit flows
to the spouse of an employee rather than to the employee himself
does not remove the action from the scope of Title VII.
Finally, the PDA's focus on women does not create a negative
inference limiting the scope of the act to the specific controversy
with a woman, a woman who is an employee, an employee in a work situ-
ation where all disabilities are covered under a company plan that pro-
vides income maintenance in the event of medical disability; that her
particular period of disability, when she cannot work because of childbirth
or anything related to childbirth is excluded ...
Mr. Hatch: ... So the Senator is satisfied that, though the committee lan-
guage I brought up, "woman affected by pregnancy" seems to be ambigu-
ous, what it means is that this act only applies to the particular woman
who is actually pregnant, who is an employee and has become pregnant
after her employment?
Mr. Williams:... Exactly.
103 S. Ct. at 2635-36 (emphasis added).
71. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
that motivated its enactment.7 3 As a result, the holding in New-
port News could serve as a catalyst for a surge of reverse discrimi-
nation cases brought by male employees. This decision may
influence male employees to closely scrutinize company benefit
packages for potential areas where they have received less com-
prehensive benefits than female employees.
The area of employment discrimination with respect to fringe
benefit plans is now more predictable. Evaluation of whether a
benefit plan violates Title VII under the Newport News standard
may be achieved by means of a simple balancing test. By weigh-
ing the aggregate level of benefits (including those provided for
dependents) which a female employee receives against the total
benefits received by a male employee, any discriminatory effect
will become apparent. This test for discrimination is a feasible
approach that can be applied in a practical manner by the lower
courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The sole purpose of Congress' enactment of the PDA was to
eradicate the Gilbert holding that discrimination based on preg-
nancy was not actionable as sex discrimination for Title VII pur-
poses. The language, as well as the legislative history of the PDA,
are replete with such evidence, 74 despite the isolated language
quoted by the dissent.75 After the enactment of the PDA, employ-
ers can no longer provide health insurance coverage for male em-
ployees for all potential disabilities they may suffer, while at the
same time limit coverage of female employees to all conditions
except pregnancy disability.
Newport News illustrates the problem which employers may
face when amending their health insurance policies to provide
full coverage of all disabling conditions of female employees. In
this instance, the amended policy provided full coverage for fe-
male employees and their dependents. However, male employ-
ees, while receiving full coverage for themselves, did not receive
full coverage for their dependents because certain pregnancy-re-
lated disabilities of their spouses were excluded.
Under such a spousal exclusion plan, the total package of fringe
benefits 76 are worth less to a male employee than to a similarly
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2629. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 7, 17, 19, and 20.
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76. Fringe benefits are not a mere gratuity but an integral part of an em-
ployee's overall compensation package. It has been stated that fringe benefits may
account for over one-third of the payroll costs for many employees. See Lindsey,
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situated female employee. Consequently, the plans violate a fun-
damental precept of employment discrimination law; that "essen-
tial equality in compensation for comparable work is at the heart"
of Title VII.77 To avoid and prevent such disparate treatment, the
Court adopted a broad interpretation of the PDA and extended
the scope of its provisions to cover dependents of male employees
who are afforded less coverage than dependents of female
employees.
MARK D. KLEIN
Employee Benefits' Bigger Bite, 69 NATIONS Bus. 75 (Dec. 1981); The Growing Value
of Those Fringe Benefits, 91 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. 69 (Dec. 21, 1981).
. 77. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 152 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis in original) (employer prohibited under Title VII from depriving
female employees of their accumulated seniority rights because of childbirth-re-
lated absences from work, since other male and female employees who took
leaves for non-pay pregnancy-related disabilities retained their accumulated
seniority).

